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Abstract 
According to an understanding of casual conversation articulated by various theories of 
discourse analysis including Conversation Analysis (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 
1974), pragmatics (Levinson, 1983) and politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987), it 
is extremely unlikely that silence would ever be regarded as an appropriate response to a 
question or accusation.  Yet, in the specialised institutional setting of a police interview, 
it is expected by the legislators in many jurisdictions that ordinary people will be able to 
access this interactional resource unproblematically, and presumably without any 
assumption of listener prejudice.  
An analysis of the interactional strategies of police interview participants in 13 police 
interviews recorded in Victoria, Australia demonstrates that the contributions of the 
suspect are highly constrained in a number of ways, including allowable turn types and 
the management of topic initiations.  If assumptions about ‘preferred responses’ based on 
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ordinary conversation are used to interpret non-response in this particular institutional 
setting, then these interactionally restricted contributions, which will be presented as 
evidence, may be susceptible to adverse inference in a way that is unlikely to be 
addressed by the judicial system.  This paper concludes that by applying principles of 
pragmatics, and in particular the use of preference, it is possible to present a case against 
the erosion of the defendant’s right to silence. 
1 Introduction 
When discussing differences in patterns of conversational behaviour across cultures or 
the sexes, it is not uncommon for linguists to label silence, as a response, a ‘turn-taking 
violation’.   To offer silence as a response to a question by another speaker, or even to 
delay one’s turn at talk, is to challenge the structural integrity of that fundamental 
element of conversation, the adjacency pair. And while such a challenge may prove no 
obstacle to the social relationship between two close companions, it is a much riskier 
strategy for a suspect to adopt during a police interrogation when a speaker is being held 
legally accountable for their every contribution.  Under these circumstances, it is clear 
that silence will have a heightened pragmatic significance. Yet it is precisely these 
circumstances under which suspects are expected to set aside normal pragmatic concerns 
about silence and access this powerful conversational resource in order to protect 
themselves against intimidation, false confession or self-incrimination. 
The obvious discord between ordinary and institutional discourse practices in a police 
interview raises questions about the extent to which the ‘right to silence’ is genuinely 
accessible to all suspects.  This issue has not gone unnoticed by the linguistic community 
and Ainsworth (1993), for example, demonstrates that women and suspects of ethnically 
diverse backgrounds may not have the linguistic or pragmatic resources to adequately 
invoke their ‘Miranda’ rights (as the rights to silence and to legal representation are 
known in the United States of America).  This paper will develop this issue further by 
taking a discourse analytic perspective that focuses on preference as it is articulated by 
Sacks (1987), Pomerantz (1984) and, more specifically Bilmes (1988).  At a broader 
level, the paper will argue that irrespective of the socio-cultural background or gender of 
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the suspect, there are considerable pragmatic impediments to any suspect’s ability to 
properly invoke their right not to respond directly to questions.   
The paper will present a detailed analysis of police interview data drawn from a corpus of 
13 interviews with suspects that were recorded in the state of Victoria, Australia.  The 
speech behaviour represented in the data extracts will be considered in relation to 
pragmatic principles, as well as conversational rules, in order to identify what happens 
when the participants attempt to access the resource of silence to a question or request in 
these interviews.  In particular, the paper will focus on the management of accusations by 
participants and, as mentioned, it will pay special attention to the rules of preference, as 
described by Bilmes (1988). 
The findings will contribute to an understanding of institutional interviews and the ways 
in which lay and professional participants may be applying different sets of 
conversational rules to the interaction.  To some extent, this paper further develops the 
detailed analyses of police interrogations by Edwards (2006; Edwards, 2008) and Stokoe 
and Edwards (2008) which have similarly contributed to the differentiation between 
police discourse and ordinary conversation. Edwards (2008) for example attends to the 
specialised legal use of language in police interviews by examining the foregrounding of 
intent and its relationship to mens rea in police interrogations.  However, the findings of 
the present study are also expected to contribute to the ongoing debate in criminal justice 
circles concerning the right to silence, and whether it is appropriate for the judge and jury 
to be allowed to draw an adverse inference from a suspect’s choice to remain silent in an 
interview. While the debate has thus far focused on the legal and civil rights issues 
concerning a suspect’s right to silence (Biber, 2005; Hamer, 2006) , this paper will 
demonstrate that it is critical that the pragmatic implications of the legislation are also 
clearly understood. 
I will begin with a discussion of the legislation and police regulations in which the right 
to silence is grounded and some of the legal considerations that need to be taken into 
account.  Following this, I will briefly describe some of the key features of police 
interview discourse, paying particular attention to interactional strategies used in the 
 4 
construction of the interview. I will then outline the notion of preference in a CA 
framework and how it applies to the adjacency pair types mentioned previously – 
accusations and attributions.  Several extracts from the data will be presented to see how 
these utterances are realised in context in terms of the sequential ordering of accusations 
and allegations and their second pair parts.  Finally, I will discuss the ramifications of 
preference for the right to silence. 
1.1 Legislative background 
In the Australian state of Victoria, considerations of interview procedure can be 
supported by reference to the Crimes Act (1958) and to the police Standing Orders, 
which are derived in part from the legislation contained in the Crimes Act.1  For instance, 
the Crimes Act (1958) S 464A (3) states that:  
Before any questioning (other than a request for the person’s name and 
address) or investigation under sub-section (2) commences, an 
investigating official must inform the person in custody that he or she does 
not have to say or do anything but that anything the person does say or do 
may be given in evidence. 
This is then represented in the police Standing Orders as follows: 
...the member shall, before asking any questions, or any further questions, 
as the case may be, advise such person that he is not obliged to answer 
such questions. (Victoria Police Standing Orders S 8.9 (1)) 
                                                            
1 Note that the Standing Orders were superceded in the early 1990s by the Operating Procedures of the 
Victoria Police Manual, which presents the same information in a more succinct format.  However, the 
Standing Orders provide a more interpretative insight to the Crimes Act and in any case, were still current 
when the data analysed here were recorded.  For further discussion of this issue, see (Heydon, 2005): 6). 
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This is followed in S 8.9 (3) with the instruction to “say words to this effect, or similar in 
meaning: ‘You are not obliged to say anything, but anything you say may be given in 
evidence.’” 
For the analyst, this provides the institutional background for the use of particular 
utterances as in the following extract from Interview 1 of the data: 
Extract 1 
25.  pio1: °yeah°⇒ (0.6) before I do this I must inform you  
26.   that you are not obliged to say or do anything  
27.   but anything you say or do (0.3) may be given in evidence  
28.   do you understand that↑ 
 
This example demonstrates how legislation enacted in the Crimes Act, via police 
regulations articulated in the Standing Orders, directly influences the utterances produced 
by the police interviewer.  There are several similar types of utterances in the data which 
can be traced back to the legislative requirements, such as utterances concerning the 
suspect’s contact with a friend or relative, and a solicitor, and the requirements 
concerning fingerprinting at the conclusion of the interview. 
In order to understand the issues surrounding the right to silence and the police caution, it 
is useful to understand what its purpose is perceived to be, according to the legal 
documentation.  While the legislation itself is relatively quiet on the matter, a great deal 
more explanatory information can be found in the case material, which forms a 
commentary to the Act, and in the Police Standing Orders.  We can find some insight in 
section 568.50.8 which mentions that “(t)he onus is on the prosecution to show that any 
admissions made by the accused were made voluntarily.  Voluntariness involves the 
exercise of free choice”  (R v Bueti CCA(SA), 12 December 1997, unreported). 
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A definition of ‘voluntary’ is provided by the Standing Orders, Section 8.5, where a 
summary of the relevant law is used to define a confession as “voluntary, not in the sense 
that it is made spontaneously or that it was volunteered, but in the sense that it was made 
in the exercise of a free choice to speak or be silent.”  Thus we can see that the use of a 
caution by police officers to advise suspects of their right to remain silent is a step which 
in itself is intended to render any subsequent confession or admission voluntary.   
However, the Police Standing Orders in subsequent sections demonstrate that 
voluntariness is not endowed upon a confession which follows a caution as a matter of 
course and police officers are instructed to avoid certain strategies which may jeopardise 
the voluntariness of any confession or admission.   For instance, Section 8.8(a) prohibits 
interviewing officers from any action which may “endeavour to force any such person 
[i.e. an inteviewee] into making any admission of guilt” and Section 8.8(g) states that 
“where such person makes a confession [a member of the Force shall not] attempt, by 
further questioning, to break down answers (sic) to which unfavourable replies have been 
received.”2 In other words, although a confession may have been offered which is 
deemed voluntary by virtue of having been made by a suspect who is aware of his or her 
right to remain silent, the approach taken by the police officers in the elicitation of such a 
confession may still render the confession involuntary.  Both the legislation and the 
Standing Orders recognise that, for suspects faced with coercive police behaviour in an 
interview, merely knowing that they can remain silent is not considered sufficient 
protection against forced confessions. 
To summarise, the right to silence as stated in the Crimes Act and articulated by police 
officers in interviews is intended to ensure that anything the suspect says after being 
cautioned, is said voluntarily – in the sense that the suspect is considered to have chosen 
to say something. 
In England, changes to the legislation governing the wording of the caution given to 
police detainees have meant that the court can draw an adverse inference from anything 
                                                            
2 I believe that the word ‘answers’ should in fact be ‘questions’ in this Section. 
 7 
that the suspects fail to mention in a police interview, but which they later rely on in court 
(See Rock, 2007 for a detailed linguistic analysis of the caution used under English law).  
That is, should a suspect invoke their right to silence in relation to a particular point made 
during the police interview and then later use that point in their defence in court, the 
judge or jury may hold that invocation against the defendant when arriving at a 
judgement.  For instance, it may be inferred by the court that the suspect was being 
deceitful or, at least uncooperative, during the interview with police.  In effect, this 
legislation has restricted the suspect’s access to their right to silence in England, and 
similar legislation is being considered in the State of Victoria, Australia.3  A significant 
difference between English criminal proceedings and Victorian proceedings is that in 
Victoria, as in most jurisdictions in Australia, a lawyer may not be present during a 
suspect’s interview with police investigators.  A suspect may telephone their lawyer 
(once) at any time to seek advice, but no other support is available to the suspect during 
the interview, except when the suspect is a child or vulnerable witness. 
1.2 Preference in Conversation Analysis 
As mentioned, the analysis of the data in this study draws on Conversation Analysis (CA) 
and the specific concept of  ‘preference’ for its theoretical basis.  Firstly, I wish to stress 
that while the concept of ‘preference’ is explored by a number of theorists in CA 
(Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, 1987), I am using it here in the same sense as Bilmes (1988) 
when making a clear distinction between the everyday and the technical 
conceptualisations.  Bilmes reminds us that the purpose of CA is to provide a set of 
conversational rules which are “conventional reference points that actors orient to and 
that give behaviour its particular intelligibility” and “by which actors understand one 
another’s behaviour” (Bilmes, 1988, p. 162). Central to the rule of preference is the 
principle of ordering, which Bilmes identifies in Sacks’ lectures on the notion of 
preference.  Bilmes’ definition of the technical notion of preference holds that following 
first pair parts of adjacency pairs (e.g. invitations, requests, accusations etc) certain 
                                                            
3 One result of this change to the UK police caution is that police interview methods are much more 
focused on information seeking and less on persuasion as suspects are legally more compelled to respond to 
questioning.  In Australia, there remains a tendency to apply the more persuasive methods of interview or 
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responses, or second pair parts, are ‘preferred’ over others by virtue of the fact that if 
there is no response, those ‘preferred’ responses will be noticeably absent.  For example, 
following an invitation it is possible for the recipient to accept or refuse the invitation.  
However, if the recipient remains silent, it is the acceptance which is lacking, and a 
refusal is assumed to have been offered in its absence.  In other words, preference is used 
by speakers to make inferences about responses they receive.  Consider the following 
exchange: 
John Do you want to see a movie with me next Friday? First pair part 
(invitation) 
Jane …er… Second pair part 
(non-response filler) 
John Well, maybe Saturday? First pair part 
(invitation) 
Jane’s non-response is interpreted by John as a rejection, since an acceptance was not 
offered, and John offers a modified invitation next on the basis of this interpretation. 
Regarding the particular case of accusation-response adjacency pairs, Atkinson and Drew 
(1979) find that following accusations, denials are preferred such that “[i]f one fails to 
deny an accusation, a denial is noticeably absent and is a cause for inference, the most 
common inference being that the accusation is true” (Bilmes, 1988, p. 167).  Moreover, 
this preference for denials following accusations is part of a broader type of preference – 
“when A attributes some action or thought or attitude to B, in B’s presence, there is a 
preference for B to contradict A interruptively or immediately following the turn in 
which the attribution was produced...When such attribution occurs without contradiction, 
a contradiction is relevantly absent” (Bilmes, 1988, p. 167).  
In a police interview, the accusation-response adjacency pair has a special legal 
significance as part of the proving of evidence.  Police officers must prove certain points 
in the course of the interview by presenting pieces of evidence they may have against the 
suspect and inviting the suspect to offer an explanation for the existence of such 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
interrogation as taught in the USA (such as the Reid method) in order to address the concern that the 
suspect will fail to respond (Halliday, 2006). 
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evidence.  Ostensibly, this is intended to establish whether there might be innocent 
explanations for apparently incriminating evidence and thus avoid wrongful convictions.  
However, according to police interviewing methods, such as Eric Shepherd’s 
Conversation Management (Shepherd, 1993) it is considered helpful for police 
interviewers to use this phase as an opportunity to persuade a suspect to change their 
story in favour of the police version of events by drawing attention to evidence that 
contradicts the suspect’s own version.  Thus, the presentation of points of evidence is 
very often the most challenging and conflictual part of the interview and, as such, is 
typically realized as a series of accusation-response adjacency pairs.  As we shall see 
below, the extent to which a suspect can adequately access his or her right to silence 
during this phase is diminished because of the broader interactional features of the police 
interview. 
1.3 Features of police interview interactions 
The interactional strategies found in the police interviews analysed all contribute to the 
construction of the interview discourse as an oriented-to chain of adjacency pairs 
(Frankel, 1990), most of which can be loosely classified as question/answer pairs.  In all 
respects, police interviews match the general criteria of institutional interviews discussed 
by Drew and Heritage (1992).  Each turn of the interview participants is constructed to 
maintain a Q-A sequence, even when the nature of the turn would normally cause some 
change in the chaining sequence.  Suspect-initiated utterances and topic shift (Button & 
Casey, 1984) are produced only within exchange structures or turn types that facilitate the 
return of the floor to the police participant at their conclusion.  For example, if a suspect 
initiates a question, it is always a clarification question, which, once the clarification has 
been received from the interviewing officer, allows for the suspect to respond to a prior 
police question.  In this way, suspect initiated questions form insert sequences (Levinson, 
1983, pp. 304-305) as follows: 
Police interviewer Q1  
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Suspect interviewee  Q2 
Police interviewer  A2 
Suspect interviewee A1  
In other words, there is an inflexible ‘chain rule’ (Sacks, 1992) governing turn allocation 
which operates in police interviews so that recurring sets of adjacency pairs obligate the 
suspect to respond to first-pair parts, such as questions, and return the floor to the police 
interviewer.  
If we consider the institutional requirements which produce the interview turn structure, 
we see that it is the role of the police officer as ‘elicitor’ which is crucial in establishing 
the recurring chain rule.  This is made clear in the allocation of topic management 
strategies.  As discussed, one of the results of the chain rule is that the role of interviewer 
affords the police officer a far greater range of topic initiation devices than the 
interviewee.  Whereas the interviewee is only able to introduce new topics in ways which 
do not obligate the interviewer to take up a respondent role, the interviewer can introduce 
a new topic within any first pair part.  The interviewee is therefore constrained to topic 
initiations which are minimally obligating and can be easily ignored, while the 
interviewer is able to introduce new topics within highly obligating adjacency pair 
structures.  For instance, the interviewer is able to ask questions which obligate the 
interviewee to produce a topically-relevant answer, even if the interviewee’s previous 
turn related to a completely different topic. 
This extract demonstrates how this is realised in the data: 
Extract 2 
380.  pio1: do you know why she would have gone out the back room↑ 
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381.   (0.4) li’ would she have been scared or↓ 
382.  IN1: maybe she was ⇒ 
383.   but m’ Betty’s never ev seen me like that↓ 
384.   I’ve never been like that before↓ 
385.   (0.4) Betty knows I would not hurt her or hurt anyone↓ 
386.   (1.1) and she must have known something really sparked him off↓ 
387.   to get me goin like that ↓ 
388.   something had to be goin↓ 
389.   hh //something* had to ∧ 
390.  pio1: w’l what* happened then-↓ 
391.  IN1: (1.1) get me going to do something like that↓ 
392.  pio1: you’ve hit him a coupla times⇒ 
393.   he’s um (.) holding his mouth or bleeding ⇒ 
The effort made by IN1 to complete his turn in line 391, when he has previously been 
interrupted by a topically disjunctive question put to him by pio1 (lines 389-390), is 
subsequently ignored by pio1, and this only serves to underline the weakness of the 
obligation on the interviewer to take up new information provided by the interviewee in 
this format. Several other cases exist in the data of interviewing officers ignoring new 
information provided by the suspect, and taking the floor to ask an unrelated question.   
However, this example best demonstrates the phenomenon because of the overt display 
by IN1 that he considers the information important.   
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The application of a Q-A chain rule in interviews provides police officers with recurrent 
access to the floor to produce highly obligating topic initiation devices in any sequential 
position. Thus, the structure of the turn-taking mechanism ensures that police 
interviewers are endowed with an authoritative voice by virtue of their institutional role, 
while suspects are heavily constrained in their allowable contributions.  We need to 
recognise that such an authoritative voice can provide the means by which a police 
officer may use inappropriate pressure to elicit a confession or admission.  
2 Accusations and attributions 
Accusations and attributions form a key resource for police interviewers trying to 
establish a police version of events as they present sections of the police narrative in a 
form that obligates the suspect to respond.  In this section, I will present a number of 
examples of accusations and attributions made by the interviewing officers and the 
responses offered by the suspects.  In these examples, it is noticeable that the rules of 
accusation-response adjacency pairs described by Bilmes (1988) are clearly invoked by 
the participants.  In Extract 3, below, we see the participants producing an accusation-
denial pair: 
Extract 3 
314.  pio1: he states that it was a closed fist ↓ 
315.   that you //punched* him in the //mouth↓* 
316.  IN1: nah↓* caw⇒* 
In this example, IN1 interrupts pio1 in line 316 to deny the allegation made against him.  
This form of denial is predicted by Bilmes (1988) according to the rules of preference 
which state that a denial will appear “interruptively or immediately following” the 
accusation/attribution first pair part.  Another example from the same interview is given 
in Extract 4, below: 
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Extract 4 
333.  pio1: (1.3) it’s also alleged that there was actually three hits ↓ 
334.  IN1: (0.5) no= 
335.  pio1: =two punches ⇒ 
336.   and then //a* backhander ⇒ before you left↓ 
337.  IN1: w’l* 
338.   (0.7) w’l I tell y what if I gave out three ⇒ 
339.   they must have been quick↓ 
Here we see that in lines 334 and 337, IN1 again interrupts pio1 to deny the accusation. 
The next example is from another interview and demonstrates that when the suspect takes 
a different approach to his response, it is not oriented to as a denial by the police 
interviewer and ultimately it is ignored. 
Extract 5 
159.  pio2: (0.8) so ah:: ((creaky voice)) // what didju*didju (.) forcibly (0.2) drag ‘er outta the house↓ 
160.  IN2: like I said look I⇒*  
161.  IN2: (1.0) aw well it was more o’ less (.) you know arguin an’ pushin’ n’ pullin’ n  
162.   (0.4) yeah∧ n’↓ (1.4) whe’∧ 
163.   (1.0) I grabbed’a by the bag↓ (0.2) a-  
164.   no that was outside I grabbed’a by the↓ (0.2) by ‘er hand∧bag↓  
165.   she had ‘er handbag over ‘er shoulder⇒  
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166.   (0.8) cos we were going⇒  
167.   (0.4) and then I d’n know what happened↓ 
168.   (1.0) she↓ (1.2) must have (.) gone to take off⇒ or someth’ like that⇒ 
169.   grabbed her by the handbag⇒  
170.   and↓ (1.4) I remember ‘er (h)handbag got ripped to shreds∧ 
In Extract 5 above, IN2 does not directly deny the accusation implicit in pio2’s utterance 
in line 159 – that IN2 “forcibly dragged” his girlfriend out of the house.  He begins to 
speak in overlap with the police officer in line 160, at the point when pio2 is beginning 
his accusation.  However, this cannot be seen as an interruptive denial, because firstly, 
IN2 doesn’t complete his utterance so that it forms a denial, and secondly, the accusation 
of “forcibly dragging” the victim has not actually been made at this point. When the 
accusation is completed in line 159 and IN2 commences his response – “aw well it was 
more o less you know arguin an pushin n pullin” – he does not offer a direct denial but 
rather describes the context of the actions.  This is pertinent because a little later, in line 
181 (see Extract 6 below), pio2 indicates that he believes IN2 was still draggin’ ‘er when 
in fact IN2 did not confirm ever having ‘dragged’ the victim.  Therefore, pio2 has heard 
IN2’s lack of a denial as an acceptance of the accusation. 
Extract 6 
181.  pio2 were you ah⇒* (.) still draggin’ ‘er at this stage∧ 
Similarly in lines 184-187 (see Extract 7 below), pio2 makes an accusation that IN2 has 
dragged his girlfriend by the hair.  IN2 does not expressly deny this in the immediately 
following turn but says it happened at a different time to that indicated by pio2. 
Extract 7 
184.  pio2 (1.8) right↓ (.) it’s it’s alleged that at that stage⇒  
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185.   that it was er (0.2) thatcha had (.) hold of ‘er hai:r↓ 
186.   (0.2) dragged her out by the hair↓ waddeyer say to that∧ 
187.  IN2 (0.8) that was after she went back into the house⇒ (0.2) // an I*   // ( *) 
Later, in lines 193-197 (see Extract 8 below), IN2 explains that he did not drag Leila 
outside by the hair, but rather that he had hold of her hair as she was sitting inside and 
tried to pull her to her feet. 
Extract 8 
192.  pio2 (0.2) she went back inside∧ // what* happened then↓ 
193.  IN2: yep*↓ (0.2) yeah↓ that’s when I dragged her↓  
194.   (0.4) I didn’t dra:g her⇒ (0.4) kinda⇒ (0.2) by the hair outta th’ house∧ 
195.   I (0.8) she was⇒ (0.2) kinda⇒ (0.4) kneeling in front of the TV⇒  
196.   and I just went in there and grabbed ‘er by th’ hair n’⇒  
197.   kinda (0.6) tried to lift ‘er up∧ and yeah∧ 
198.  pio2: (1.0) w’ would you agree that ⇒ 
199.   thas: (0.4) not the normal way that anyone would ah⇒  
200.   (0.2) assist someone up⇒ onto their feet by pick’n them up by the hair∧ 
201.  IN2: (0.2) not really∧ 
202.  pio2: (1.0) right and ah (0.2) what happened then↓  
203.   after↓ (.) you’ve↓ (0.2) dragged ‘er up by the hair↓ 
204.  IN2: (0.8) well eventually we’ve got in the car an (0.2) left∧ 
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Clearly, a denial placed at a distance from the accusation does not have much impact, 
and, given this lack of an adjacent denial, the police officer is able to continue the 
interview as though IN2 accepts the accusation.  This is evident when he restates that 
supposition in line 203: after↓ (.) you’ve↓ (0.2) dragged ‘er up by the hair↓ .  Again in 
the following extract, pio2 mentions dragging her outside↑, despite the fact that IN2 has 
never directly admitted that he undertook this action, and has offered forms of denial, as 
seen above. 
Extract 9 
239.  pio2: a::hm⇒ (2.0) it’s a::h⇒ (.) she’s had (.) some injuries on ‘er arm⇒  
240.   (0.2) bruising to bo:th (.) biceps↓ 
241.  IN2: mm hm∧=  
242.  Pio2: =at some stage↓ (0.2) didju have hold of ‘er other bicep↑  
243.   (.) dragging her outside↑ 
These examples from INT2 demonstrate that failing to produce a clear denial 
immediately following an accusation is a risky strategy that may result in any subsequent 
denial being ignored.  As will be discussed further below, this implies that there may be 
dire consequences for the suspect who chooses to invoke his or her right not to answer 
any question.  
Extract 10, below, offers a further example of a denial, this time from INT3.  The slow 
pace of this interview is such that the extended pause before IN3’s response in line 231 is 
not considered a lack of preferred response. 
Extract 10 
229.  pio3 (0.4) oh right↓ (0.6) I’ll put it to you that you put em there to dry out∧ 
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230.   (0.8) for later use↓ 
231.  IN3:  (1.1) no (0.2) just (0.2) to (0.4) get out of the way∧ 
While these examples do not include cases where the suspects successfully invoke their 
right to silence, the above analysis of these data supports Bilmes’ (1988) findings in that 
denials are routinely treated as preferred responses by interviewers producing accusations 
and attributions.  As mentioned, this makes the choice to remain silent at any time in the 
interview a high risk strategy for suspects.  In the following extract from INT1 the 
suspect comes close to offering a zero response after an attribution: 
Extract 11 
433.  pio1: uh you saw the glass shatter to the ground∧ 
434.  IN1: (0.4) I just kept walking↓ 
435.   (0.2) I just got in the car ⇒ 
436.   and Rob (0.6) me friend said what the hell’s going on∧ 
437.   (0.4) whadcha do∧ 
438.  pio1: (1.2) so you didn’t bother saying anything to them↓ 
439.   that the glass was broken∧ or↓ 
In response to pio1’s attribution of seeing the glass shatter, IN1 claims that he just kept 
walking↓. This is not an overt contradiction or acceptance of the attribution.  He may 
have seen the glass shatter before he kept walking↓, or he may not have.  IN2 seems to be 
making an entirely different point to that which pio1 is pursuing and which she articulates 
in lines 438-9.  Regardless of the point IN1 may have been making though, pio1 has 
assumed that he accepts her attribution of seeing the glass shatter and being aware that it 
has shattered, as we can see in her next turn.  Thus there is evidence in this extract, as 
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well as in Extracts 5-9, that a lack of a contradiction immediately following an attribution 
is treated as an implicit acceptance of that attribution by the suspect. 
The analysis presented here supports Bilmes’ findings that denials are routinely treated as 
preferred by interviewers producing accusations and attributions, and importantly, that 
the timing and placement of the denial is key to its recognition in the interview.  This 
raises a number of concerns about the practicality of invoking of one’s right to silence – 
concerns that a traditional legal analysis may not identify since they relate to the micro-
level management of conversation. 
3 The implications of ‘preference’ for right to silence 
‘Silence’ as a legal construct in a police interview does not have to be an absence of 
utterance, as is made clear in the English caution which instructs suspects that there may 
be adverse consequences ‘if they do not mention now [in the interview] something which 
they later rely on in Court.”  In the Victorian version of the caution to suspects, the word 
silence is not specified, but instead suspects ‘do not have to say anything’.  Thus, the 
right to ‘silence’ is realised through the caution as the right not to produce information.  
In a pragmatic sense, this failure to produce or ‘mention’ information in an interviewing 
context can usually only mean failing to respond appropriately to a question, since 
interviewees do not ‘mention’ information as a topic initiation: they ‘mention’ something 
as a response (very often as a confirmation or an agreement to a first pair part) and thus 
maintain the topic initiated through the question and produce a preferred response,. In 
order not to mention or say something, in these circumstances, the suspect must offer an 
alternative version, a non-confirmation or a denial thus providing a non-preferred 
response.  These are the ways in which suspects actually access their right to ‘silence’ – 
by failing to co-construct a police narrative.   
It is helpful to recognize that the suspect’s attempts to access their right to silence, to 
ignore a question or to offer an alternative explanation without explicitly denying an 
accusation, are all heavily constrained by the discourse environment of the police 
interview.  Moreover, this is a discourse environment that can leave suspects vulnerable 
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to acts of discursive coercion by interviewing officers.  This vulnerability is addressed in 
part by legislation requiring all suspects to be informed that they have the choice to 
remain silent at any time.  However, the most technical understanding of the CA notion 
of ‘preference’ informs us that in the case of a suspect actually invoking their right to 
silence in response to any accusation or attribution made by police interviewers, a denial 
or contradiction will be relevantly absent and “[g]enerally, the conclusion drawn is that 
the recipient is acknowledging the truth of the attribution [or accusation]” (Bilmes 1988: 
167). 
This has serious ramifications for criminal justice proceedings for two reasons.  Firstly, if 
a police officer continues to make false assumptions based on the suspect’s ‘absent 
denial’ to an accusation, it may prove difficult for the suspect to address the underlying 
false assumption, particularly if the suspect wishes to continue to invoke his or her right 
to silence. In the analysis presented above, it was observed that in INT2 the police 
interviewer was able to continue to produce the allegation of ‘dragging’ after the suspect 
had chosen not to address the first allegation directly. The structure of police and other 
institutional interviews means that interviewees lack access to discursive devices, such as 
topic initiations, and questions and other first pair parts, which may be needed to address 
interviewer assumptions.  Moreover, in Victoria and most jurisdictions in Australia, 
suspects do not have the support of a trained legal professional who might be able to 
access some of these interactional resources on their behalf.  Suspects are therefore in a 
very vulnerable position, discursively speaking, and choosing not to deny an accusation 
immediately presents a great risk that a misunderstanding or presumption of guilt may 
never be addressed. 
Secondly, in a subsequent trial, the judge or jury would be likely to apply the usual rules 
of conversational preference to accusation-response pairs and infer from a delayed or 
absent denial that the suspect accepts the allegation as true. The possibility of a court 
drawing an adverse inference from a suspect’s refusal to respond to police questions 
continues to be a cause for concern within the legal fraternity, as evidenced by recent 
articles dealing with the topic in law journals (Biber, 2005; Hamer, 2006).  Whilst these 
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authors consider the legal arguments surrounding the recognition of a suspect’s 
invocation of the right to silence in the subsequent court trial, this research makes it clear 
that there are substantial linguistic considerations. 
It is critical that these pragmatic issues are part of the debate about any change to the 
legislation that removes the suspect’s right to remain silent without the threat of adverse 
inference. Suspects are in a discursively vulnerable position and access to silence as a 
legitimate resource in a police interview is already at risk due to the assumptions that 
police interviewers themselves are able to make at the time of interviewing.  Such 
assumptions are presently avoided in the courtroom at least, because adverse inference is 
not permitted should a suspect choose to remain silent.  Conversation Analysis and the 
technical notion of preference present a powerful argument to protect the suspect’s right 
to remain silent, and if an argument is made that the proposed changes to the legislation 
may encourage reluctant suspects to impart valuable information, it must be remembered 
that it is a suspect’s right not to be compelled to answer questions.  
Finally, while the legislative debate will no doubt continue in legal fora, this study has 
clearly demonstrated that CA can be successfully and usefully applied to an ideological 
problem precisely because ‘its concern is with relevance, intelligibility and systemic 
function’ (Bilmes, 1988, p. 161). 
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Appendix 
Transcription conventions 
Symbol Description 
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Symbol Description 
pio Primary interviewing officer 
IN Interviewee (suspect) 
// overlapping speech commences 
* overlapping speech ends 
= latching 
(0.6) silence measured in seconds 
(.) micro-pause of less than 0.2 seconds 
°word° softer than surrounding speech 
word syllables having greater stress than surrounding sounds 
↑ high rise intonation 
∧ low rise intonation 
⇒ level intonation 
↓ falling intonation 
:: the sound is lengthened by one syllable for each colon 
- truncated word 
 24 
Symbol Description 
(( ))) transcriber’s remarks, including comments on voice quality or non-verbal 
sounds 
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